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Two Ironies of UPL Laws 
David McGowan* 
It is illegal to practice law without a license, so it would be 
good to know what practicing law is. Opinions vary. The 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers says the 
“definitions and tests employed by courts to delineate 
unauthorized practice . . . have been vague or conclusory, while 
jurisdictions have differed significantly in describing what 
constitutes unauthorized practice in particular areas.”1 The 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) attempted a model definition 
several years ago, but its proposal was criticized by the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) on the (correct) ground that it reserved too many tasks 
for lawyers.2 The FTC and DOJ noted that, although almost all 
states “have statutes that purport to define the practice of law, in 
reality these statutes tend to be vague in scope and contain 
broad qualifiers.”3 
If anything, these comments understate the case. Definitions 
of the practice of law tend to be embarrassing. Some states offer 
definitions so general they say little more than that judges or bar 
officials will know unlicensed practice when they see it, 
which was Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity.4 Although 
unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) restrictions might present 
“the task of trying to define what may be indefinable,” as Justice 
Stewart thought obscenity regulations might, the aptness of the 
comparison is not cause for optimism.5 Other states adopt rules 
that resemble the securities laws in their extensive categorization, 
but still leave courts and enforcers broad discretion. Judicial 
 
 * Lyle L. Jones Professor of Competition and Innovation Law, University of San 
Diego School of Law. Thanks to George Cohen, Bob Fellmeth, Andy Perlman, and Brad 
Wendel for their comments. Errors that remain are my fault.  
 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000).  
 2 See Comments on the American Bar Association’s Proposed Model Definition of the 
Practice of Law, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/comments-american-bar-associations-proposed-model-definition-practice-law 
[http://perma.cc/2KMG-H3HB]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 5 Id. 
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opinions often argue that comprehensive definitions are 
impossible, which does not help much. 
The basic problem is one of design and legal craft. If a 
concept is “indefinable,” there is no point trying to define it. A 
definition is not the right tool to regulate the provision of 
law-related services. No definition will distill the “practice of law” 
to its essence. There is no essence. The “practice of law” is what 
we say it is. The problem is not just semantics. A definition-based 
approach suggests to enforcers and judges that regulating legal 
services can be and should be done with rules, when standards 
are better suited to consumer protection. The result is often a 
muddled combination of the least desirable aspects of both rules 
and standards.  
The definitional approach may harm consumers in three 
different ways. The practice of law may be defined too narrowly, 
so consumers are exposed to incompetent (or not-yet-competent) 
sellers, or too broadly, so consumers are denied the benefits of 
competition from competent, but unlicensed, sellers. In addition, 
definitional approaches treat licenses as a solution to the 
problem of competence. To unsophisticated consumers, a license 
may imply that a seller has skills he or she may not have. 
Passing the bar exam does not entail practical competence in any 
particular field. Allowing licensees to tout a credential even 
partially divorced from practical skill but which authorizes such 
advertising, risks misleading consumers. UPL restrictions 
sometimes state that sellers may not hold themselves out to be 
lawyers if they are not, but licenses can be a form of holding out 
as well. In each case, the real concern is competence: does the 
seller’s expression accurately convey their ability to help a buyer 
with a problem? 
A legal services regulation designed for clients and 
consumers should work more from the bottom up than from the 
top down. It should not bother with the definitional problem 
because there is no essence to define; any definition would either 
be materially incomplete or unhelpfully vague. Such a regulation 
should include few, if any, categories that are declared 
off-limits to non-lawyers. Some amount of stipulation is 
inevitable—notably for tribunals—but it should be kept to a 
minimum. The regulation should favor standards over rules and 
use presumptions tied to competence to distinguish permissible 
from impermissible practice. The regulation should not try to 
compare the practice of law with some baseline of average or 
ordinary intelligence, and it should not conflate prohibitions on 
misrepresentation of a provider’s skill or qualifications, which 
are always objectionable, with the scope of permissible practice.  
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If nothing else, I will argue that this approach lessens two 
ironies that characterize the concept of unlicensed practice. 
Definitions of the practice of law mark the set of things only 
lawyers may do, but the definitions often show little evidence of 
legal craft, and the licenses that satisfy the definition may 
present risks similar to the “holding out” concerns reflected in 
many state laws.  
I. 
A brief survey of state definitions is instructive. Maine 
illustrates one end of the spectrum. One Maine court noted that 
its bar rules “do not explicitly state what constitutes ‘the practice 
of law,’ nor have we ever defined what constitutes ‘the practice of 
law.’”6 The court found no need to try a definition where a lawyer 
was disciplined for his conduct in trying to negotiate discounts 
for a client’s medical bills and track down the biological father of 
her children, all while starting an affair with her.7 (The affair 
ended badly.) The court simply said, “the term ‘practice of law’ is 
a ‘term of art connoting much more than merely working with 
legally-related matter.’”8 
Other states posit general definitions that work outward 
from relatively specific core cases, such as appearing before a 
tribunal or preparing a “legal document.” California does this. 
The California Supreme Court’s opinion in Birbrower, Montalbano, 
Condon & Frank v. Superior Court9 defines the term as “the 
doing and performing services in a court of justice in any matter 
depending therein throughout its various stages and in 
conformity with the adopted rules of procedure.”10 This definition 
seems clear (and should not extend to private arbitration, though 
the court held it did), but California does not stop there. Under 
California law “any definition of legal practice is, given the 
complexity and variability of the subject, incapable of universal 
 
 6 Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Mangan, 763 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Me. 2001). The 
Court wanted to discipline Mangan, and the case could be written off as a rough justice 
application of a “holding out” theory: if you call yourself a lawyer, you will be held to that 
standard. But Mangan was right to say that non-lawyers could have done much, if not all, 
of what he did. That a desired result may have driven the holding hardly vindicates 
the definition. 
 7 Id. at 1191. 
 8 Id. at 1193 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm. of Maryland v. Shaw, 354 Md. 
636, 732 (1985)). 
 9 Birbrower v. Super. Ct., 17 Cal. 4th 119, 128 (1998) (quoting People ex rel. 
Lawyers’ Inst. of San Diego v. Merchants’ Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 535 (1922)). 
 10 Id. 
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application and can provide only a general guide to whether a 
particular act or activity is the practice of law.”11  
Washington has defined the practice of law to include 
litigating in court but “in a larger sense [it] includes legal advice 
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and 
contracts by which legal rights are secured.”12 The definition 
extended to “the selection and completion of form legal documents, 
or the drafting of such documents, including deeds, mortgages, 
deeds of trust, promissory notes and agreements modifying these 
documents,” and may be summarized succinctly: “services that 
are ordinarily performed by licensed lawyers and that involve 
legal rights and obligations constitute the practice of law.”13 This 
authority is still cited by Washington courts, but Washington 
also defines the term for purposes of a criminal statute,14 and in 
a rule of court.15 
Some states provide seemingly straightforward definitions 
that are expanded by judicial caveat. One of New York’s two 
statutory definitions includes appearing in court or holding 
oneself out as being entitled to practice in court “or in any other 
manner,”16 but the judicial gloss on this definition makes clear 
that the practice of law includes “legal advice and counsel” as 
well.17 “Legal advice and counsel” is not separately defined.  
Florida adds two components to its capacious definition, 
which asks in part whether rights affected by some service are 
important and which explicitly disclaims the notion that any 
definition could be fixed in time. In its failed effort to require 
patent agents to be licensed Florida lawyers, the Florida 
Supreme Court offered this definition: 
[I]f the giving of such advice and performance of such services affect 
important rights of a person under the law, and if the reasonable 
protection of the rights and property of those advised and served 
requires that the persons giving such advice possess legal skill and a 
knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average 
citizen, then the giving of such advice and the performance of such 
 
 11 People v. Landlords’ Prof’l Servs., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1599, 1609 (1989) (eviction 
services constituted UPL). 
 12 Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1074 (Wash. 2002) (quoting In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Droker & Mulholland, 370 P.2d 242, 248 (Wash. 1962)).  
 13 Id. 
 14 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.48.180 (West 2016). 
 15 WASH. ST. CT. R. 24 (2015), http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules. 
display&group=ga&set=gr&ruleid=gagr24 [http://perma.cc/36XR-VRLY]. 
 16 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 478 (McKinney 2016). 
 17 Servidone Const. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 911 F. Supp. 560, 565–
66 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
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services by one for another as a course of conduct constitute the 
practice of law.18 
The court in Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh cited this definition 
with approval and stated that it “is given content by this Court 
only as it applies to specific circumstances of each case.”19 The 
court agreed with a Michigan court that “any attempt to 
formulate a lasting, all-encompassing definition of ‘practice of 
law’ is doomed to failure ‘for the reason that under our system of 
jurisprudence such practice must necessarily change with the 
everchanging [sic] business and social order.’”20 Michigan later 
backtracked on this statement while holding that a bank’s 
preparation of mortgage documents was not the practice of law. 
The court held that “the preparation of ordinary leases, 
mortgages and deeds do not involve the practice of law. . . . They 
have become ‘so standardized that to complete them for usual 
transactions requires only ordinary intelligence rather than legal 
training.’”21 Florida, however, remains skeptical,22 as does the 
definition quoted above from Washington. New York’s second 
statutory definition reserves part of this cookie-cutter work for 
attorneys as well.23 
Other states provide broad definitions with exclusions that 
resemble safe harbors. Texas, which had an early and 
unproductive encounter with interactive software,24 defines the 
practice of law to include court work “as well as a service 
rendered out of court, including the giving of advice or the 
rendering of any service requiring the use of legal skill or 
knowledge” and has a typical disclaimer of any limitation on the 
scope of this definition, which “does not deprive the judicial 
branch of the power and authority . . . to determine whether 
 
 18 State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), vacated sub nom. 
Sperry v. State of Fla. ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 404 (1963). 
 19 Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1978).  
 20 Id. at 1191–92 (quoting State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 1976), 
abrogated by Dressel v. Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Mich. 2003)). 
 21 Dressel v. Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Mich. 2003) (quoting Hulse v. Criger, 
247 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Mo. 1952)). 
 22 The Fla. Bar re Advisory Opinion–Medicaid Planning Activities, 183 So.3d 276, 
286 (Fla. 2015) (holding the preparation of documents relating to Medicaid planning to be 
the practice of law). 
 23 N.Y. JUD. ACT § 484 (McKinney 2016) (“No natural person shall ask or receive, 
directly or indirectly, compensation for appearing for a person other than himself as 
attorney in any court or before any magistrate, or for preparing deeds, mortgages, 
assignments, discharges, leases or any other instruments affecting real estate, wills, 
codicils, or any other instrument affecting the disposition of property after death, or 
decedents' estates . . .” unless admitted to practice.). 
 24 Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (per curiam). I say “unproductive” because Texas’ UPL commission won the 
case but lost the war, as the definition in the text suggests. 
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other services and acts not enumerated may constitute the 
practice of law.”25 But Texas then takes a step back and states 
that the practice of law does not include written materials such 
as books or software if the materials “clearly and conspicuously 
state that the products are not a substitute for the advice of 
an attorney.”26 
Arizona varies this approach. It defines the practice of law 
broadly through a series of categories that include preparing a 
document intended to affect or secure legal rights, expressing a 
legal opinion, representing another in formal dispute resolution 
(including mediation), or negotiating. Arizona then exempts 
several specific situations; an employee may designate a personal 
representative for a board hearing dealing with personnel 
matters, a corporation may designate an officer or other agent to 
represent it before the state’s version of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (“OSHA”), and an ambulance service 
may do the same for administrative hearings before the 
Department of Health Services.27 In all, Arizona has twenty-one 
substantive exceptions.28 
Similarly, Connecticut defines the practice of law to include 
“ministering to the legal needs of another person and applying 
legal principles and judgment to the circumstances or objectives 
of that person.”29 The statute provides a non-exclusive list of 
items, which includes “[g]iving advice or counsel to persons 
concerning or with respect to their legal rights and responsibilities 
or with regard to any matter involving the application of legal 
principles to rights, duties, obligations, or liabilities,” or “drafting 
any legal document or agreement affecting the legal rights of a 
person.”30 The statute also includes more specific restrictions on 
holding out and appearing before a tribunal. It then specifies 
twelve exceptions, including acting as a real estate agent or 
broker, acting as an accountant, or “performing such other 
activities as the courts of Connecticut have determined do not 
constitute the unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law.”31 
These definitions vary in detail, but are all, at least in part, 
defiantly ambiguous. Defiant ambiguity may be a natural 
response when asked to define the undefinable, to use Justice 
Stewart’s phrase, but it is not a helpful response.  
 
 25 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.101 (West 2016). 
 26 Id.  
 27 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. SUP. CT. R. 31. 
 28 Id. 
 29 CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 2–44A(a).  
 30 Id. § 2.44A(a)(1)–(6). 
 31 Id. § 2.44A(b)(1)–(12). 
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In the 2000s, several states proposed definitions of their 
own, prompting the ABA’s model definition project. The FTC 
commented on specific state proposals as well as the ABA 
proposal. Its comments to Connecticut are typical. Connecticut 
proposed to amend its definition and the FTC weighed in, stating 
that staff believed “non-attorneys should be permitted to compete 
with attorneys in areas where no specialized legal knowledge and 
training is demonstrably necessary to protect the interests of 
consumers.”32 FTC staff recommended that Connecticut add 
language the District of Columbia had used to narrow its rule.33 
That definition was similar to the Connecticut definition 
described above, but included language limiting the definition of 
the practice of law to “the provision of professional legal advice or 
services where there is a client relationship of trust or reliance.”34 
The rule then listed categories presumed to constitute the 
practice of law. The comment to the D.C. rule states that 
this qualification: 
[I]s designed to focus first on the two essential elements of the 
practice of law: The provision of legal advice or services, and a client 
relationship of trust or reliance. Where one provides such advice or 
services within such a relationship, there is an implicit representation 
that the provider is authorized or competent to provide them; just as 
one who provides any services requiring special skill gives an implied 
warranty that they are provided in a good and workmanlike manner.35 
Connecticut did not adopt this suggestion (nor did 
Washington in the rule it adopted), but Nebraska did.36 In 
comments to Hawaii, the FTC emphasized that the D.C. rule 
utilized rebuttable presumptions to help clarify its definition.37 
The D.C. rule lists six categories of work presumed to be the 
practice of law—such as “preparing any legal document” or 
“preparing or expressing legal opinions”—and allows that 
presumption to be rebutted: 
 
 32 Letter, Federal Trade Comm’n, Proposed Section 2–44A of the Rules of the 
Superior Court entitled “Definition of the Practice of Law” (May 17, 2007), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-
mr.carl-e.testo-counsel-rules-committee-superior-court-concerning-proposed-rules-
definition-practice-law/v070006.pdf. 
 33 Id. at 6–7.  
 34 D.C. CT. APP. R. 49(b)(2) (West 2016).  
 35 Id. cmt. to § 49(b)(2). 
 36 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-1001 (West 2016). 
 37 Letter, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comments on Revised Proposed Rule Concerning 
Unauthorized Practice of Law at 1–2 (Apr. 20, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-and-department-justice-comment-
supreme-court-hawaii-concerning-proposed-definition-practice-law/v080004hiunauthorized 
practiceoflaw.pdf. 
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The presumption that one’s engagement in one of the enumerated 
activities is the “practice of law” may be rebutted by showing that 
there is no client relationship of trust or reliance, or that there is no 
explicit or implicit representation of authority or competence to 
practice law, or that both are absent.38 
The D.C. rule therefore uses the presumption and rebuttal 
structure to clarify the definition, which also incorporates the 
concept of trust and reliance.  
II. 
Defiant ambiguity is what comes of the choice to employ a 
general definition. In this Part, I argue that, as a matter of craft, 
that choice is unwise. Like patent claims, definitions work well 
when applied to discrete, concrete objects. They work poorly 
when applied to abstract ideas. They are no good at all when the 
definiendum is a diffuse concept that changes over time, as is the 
case with the “practice of law.” Then a definition is the wrong 
tool to use; it does more harm than good in relation to 
consumer protection. 
The definitions surveyed in Part I too often wind up chasing 
their tails, often trying to clarify vague terms by reference to 
equally vague terms, and always using broad language that 
creates ambiguity and wide discretion for enforcement. This Part 
addresses craft and poses the question of how a UPL restriction 
should be built. What elements should it have, and how should 
they fit together? I turn to substance in Part III.  
A. Rule or Standard? 
The definitions surveyed in Part I take for granted that the 
practice of law needs to be defined through a written statement 
of scope. The “challenge” the ABA perceived as the basis for its 
efforts was cast in definitional terms; the question was “whether 
to create a model definition of the practice of law that would 
support the goal to provide the public with better access to legal 
services, be in concert with governmental concerns about 
anticompetitive restraints, and provide a basis for effective 
enforcement of unauthorized practice of law statutes.”39 That is a 
lot of work for a definition. 
 
 38 D.C. CT. APP. R. 49(c)(3) (West 2016).  
 39 Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law Challenge Statement, 
AM. BAR ASS’N., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_ 
force_model_definition_practice_law/model_definition_challenge.html [http://perma.cc/8
3QR-WHFB].  
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Definitions of the practice of law do not work well being 
judged by the goal of consumer protection or by the criteria one 
should use to assess the design of a law. Definitions try but 
largely fail to do the job of a rule. In the attempt they either fail 
to do the job of a standard, which leads to arbitrary decisions, or 
they incur the costs of a standard but then truncate analysis in 
an effort to render a formal rather than a substantive decision, 
which leads to arbitrary decisions that are costly as well. 
1. Distinguishing Rules from Standards 
The relevant issues may be framed usefully as a question of 
rules versus standards. The differences and similarities between 
these two approaches are complex and are the subject of several 
excellent analyses.40 The literature distinguishes rules from 
standards based on whether the law is given content ex ante or ex 
post.41 I follow that division here, focusing on the points I think 
most salient to restrictions on UPL. 
Most people think of rules as very specific statements and of 
standards as very general statements that end up being more a 
question than a prescription: drive no faster than seventy-five 
miles per hour is a rule, and “drive safely” is a standard. 
Analytically this common-sense difference reflects a design 
decision: should the costs necessary to give content to a law be 
sunk up front and distilled into concise expression or should the 
cost be deferred to a later time when an issue arises?42 
2. Counting Information Costs 
Three general types of costs are relevant to this analysis 
with respect to restrictions on unlicensed practice: creation costs, 
transmission costs, and application costs.  
Creation costs include the cost of investigating the conduct to 
 
 40 For a general discussion, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
592–96 (5th ed. 1998); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 
11 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).  
 41 Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, supra note 40, at 560. 
Focusing on when a law is given content differs from a proposed distinction in which rules 
are formally realized, while standards apply the purposes of the law directly to disputed 
facts, or, relatedly, between individualism and altruism, interpreted as rhetorical 
approaches to social issues. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).  
 42 This description oversimplifies. In principle, a rule may replicate a standard if 
enough variables are baked into the rule to allow it to replicate the welfare effects of the 
standard. (The point is similar to one that may be more familiar—act utilitarianism and 
rule utilitarianism may be equated if the rule includes exceptions sufficient to produce 
results equivalent to the sum of act-utilitarian choices.) See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 11 (1973).  
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be regulated, translating the information learned through 
investigation into language that expresses the desired regulation, 
and herding the language through the relevant political process. 
The amount of these costs depends on many things, including 
whether the conduct in question is engaged in or affects many 
people, whether it is easy to understand or requires significant 
expertise, and whether politically powerful groups have a 
significant stake in any proposed regulation.  
Creation costs are complex. They differ in different 
situations, and in any given situation they interact in complex 
ways. For example, take the question whether a building code 
should approve vinyl conduit for use in new construction. 
Deciding whether vinyl conduit is durable, fire-proof, and 
otherwise safe requires some expertise and probably testing. The 
rule on permissible conduit would be part of a larger building 
code, so possible interactions between vinyl and other building 
materials would have to be studied. Legislators and even 
legislative staff are probably not experts in these matters, so 
expertise would have to be acquired.  
It would make little sense for each county or city that has a 
building code to replicate this study. Vinyl conduit probably is as 
safe (or not) in Berkeley as in Bakersfield. Economies of scale 
probably could be achieved, but then governmental units would 
have an incentive to free ride on other governmental units. 
Coordination is possible in different ways, such as regional 
government consortia, but outsourcing is possible as well. In 
practice, industry associations, which have a greater per capita 
stake in studying such things, promulgate model building codes, 
while many legislatures economize on the cost of rule-creation by 
enacting those codes into law. 
But there is a flip side to the fact that industry players have 
a stake big enough to make it worth their while to study the 
merits of vinyl conduit. Incumbent firms who make steel but not 
vinyl conduit have an incentive to fight approval of vinyl conduit, 
regardless of the merit of that material. Incumbents might try to 
use local laws to preclude entry that might lower their prices. 
Such firms might spend money to fight within the association, as 
well as before governmental bodies. In this example, 
manufacturers of steel conduit recruited new members to the 
National Fire Protection Association, stacked a meeting at which 
the Association decided whether to amend the Association’s 
National Electrical Code to approve the use of vinyl conduit, and 
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voted against such use.43 The costs of acquiring information 
necessary to draft a rule were lower because they could be 
outsourced to the Association’s work, but the cost of translating 
that knowledge into adoption of an efficient rule were high 
because the economic interests that made industry players 
willing to acquire information also inclined them to defend 
entrenched interests.  
In other cases, creation of a rule will be simple. The rule may 
be joined with a standard in ways that make adoption more 
palatable, but which defers substantial costs to a later stage in 
enforcement. Copyright law is like that. The rule that copyright 
inheres in original expression fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression is simple and cheap to express, at least so long as the 
originality requirement is drained of any real content (as it is). 
But the very thinness that makes this rule relatively simple and 
easy to adopt invites all sorts of particular objections. To make 
the rule palatable, a legislature might choose to enact a 
standards-based defense, such as fair use, making the question of 
liability far murkier than our examples of the speed limit or 
approval of vinyl conduit. The defense might deflect objections 
and thereby ease passage through the political process, but the 
costs are simply deferred at the expense of clarity. 
Transmission costs. This idea refers to the cost people 
subject to the rule incur in learning the rule. (The cost of 
reproducing and distributing the rule are included, but these 
costs will almost always be low.)44 The question is whether it is 
easy to understand the law and to translate that understanding 
into advice or into application by a tribunal, such as by 
translating the law into legal advice to a client or into jury 
instructions. These costs are important to deterrence; if a rule is 
expected to deter behavior, it needs to specify that behavior well 
enough for informed persons to obey. 
This question, too, is complex. One needs to know how many 
people the rule will affect and what kind of people they are. A 
speed limit targets everyone who drives, which in many places is 
at least most adults, so it has to work for large numbers of very 
different people—both barely numerate drivers and physicists. A 
building code will be used mostly by builders, inspectors, and 
insurers, so it is safe to presume a certain amount of audience 
sophistication, but code violations might be disputed and 
adjudicated, so the understanding of a potential tribunal matters, 
 
 43 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496–97 (1988). 
 44 This concept is akin to identifying the illocutionary meaning of an expression of law.  
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too.45 Excessive complexity or opacity risk disregard of the law 
and the failure of deterrence. Both over-deterrence and under-
deterrence count as failure. Artists puzzled by the fair use factors 
might simply throw their hands up and proceed with an 
infringing project or abandon a non-infringing project. 
Application costs. These are the costs of applying the law to a 
dispute about whether conduct is lawful. They will include the 
cost of at least minimal factual inquiry—how fast was the car 
going, did a builder use vinyl conduit—and the inquiry may be 
extensive. The point of rules is to make application relatively 
easy by investing in the important work up front, so adjudication 
is as simple as in these examples. 
Legal expressions are not always reliable guides to this cost. 
Copyright’s fair use defense lists four nonexclusive factors, but 
one of them (whether the defendant sought profit) matters little 
in any case in which the defense is plausible, and two others 
(whether use is transformative and whether it usurped the 
plaintiff’s market) are in many cases just two sides of the same 
coin. And this supposed multi-factor inquiry may reduce to a fact-
finder’s intuitions about property—was the defendant just free 
riding or was she trading in substantial part on her own 
contributions? That might not be a costly case to try, multiple 
factors notwithstanding. In contrast, some standards sound 
costly to implement and probably are costly to implement. In 
most cases, a malpractice plaintiff must establish the standard 
of care and show breach, and both issues may require costly and 
contradictory expert testimony. What is the standard of 
care for underwriter’s counsel in a shelf registered offering? 
Opinions vary.46 
Error costs and agency costs deserve particular attention 
with respect to unlicensed practice. Error costs arise when a rule 
is applied to cases that do not present the risk a rule guards 
against; a particularly high-performing car may drive more 
safely at 90 miles per hour than an economy car does at 75, but 
the former driver violates a 75 mph speed limit and the latter 
does not. Each case presents an error, but the expected cost of 
 
 45 Professor Kaplow provides another good example: rules regulating transport of 
hazardous waste may be complex and thus costly to learn, but few people are in that line 
of work, and therefore the sum of such learning costs is likely to be low, at least compared 
to ordinary driving rules such as the speed limit, which in some areas applies to millions 
of people. See Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, supra note 40, at 563. 
 46 See generally In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(discussing the question with respect to underwriter’s liability, which may be extended to 
question of what underwriter’s counsel should advise underwriters to do to establish 
diligence with regard to shelf offerings). 
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each error is probably low—lower than the cost of inquiring 
whether either driver was driving safely, all things considered. If 
the error costs of a rule are high, however, inquiry might be 
worth the effort. This possibility is sometimes summarized in a 
rule of thumb (pardon the pun): employ rules when information 
costs exceed error costs, and employ standards when the reverse 
is true. Assuming for the moment that we can get a handle on 
these costs (a big assumption), this idea is common sense. The 
problem is, as it often is, that measuring such costs is hard. 
Hunches, rules of thumb, and rent seeking play a greater role in 
reality than they do in this description. 
Agency costs relate to discretion in enforcement. Assuming 
that consumer protection is the goal of restrictions on unlicensed 
practice, agency costs could take the form of enforcement actions 
against sellers who pose no real threat to consumers but who 
may compete effectively with lawyers. The more capacious the 
content of a rule, the greater discretion enforcement officials 
have, and the greater the risk that they will use such discretion 
to prop up lawyers’ income rather than to protect consumers.  
3. Mixed Models: The Example of Antitrust 
Antitrust law provides a useful example of these costs, and 
its emphasis on competition is relevant to the design of any UPL 
regulation.47 Antitrust employs a per se rule of illegality for 
practices so likely to harm competition that extensive inquiry is 
not efficient.48 Practices whose net effects are not so obvious are 
subject to a contextual balancing analysis under the rule of 
reason, which presents a standard in the form of a question: Does 
a practice restrict competition unreasonably? The rule of reason 
analysis takes the form of shifting burdens. A plaintiff must show 
the defendant’s actions harm competition. If the plaintiff does, the 
defendant must show that those actions produce benefits to 
competition. If the defendant discharges that burden, the plaintiff 
must show the benefits could be obtained through less restrictive 
alternatives or that they are outweighed by losses.49  
The current doctrine is less categorical than it used to be. 
Rather than assuming that the per se analysis and rule of reason 
analysis are discrete and different things, courts emphasize 
 
 47 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 39 (2d ed. 2001). 
 48 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc'y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) 
(explaining the per se rule extends to “agreements whose nature and necessary effect are 
so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish 
their illegality—they are ‘illegal per se.’”). 
 49 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070–74 (9th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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context. The result is more a continuum of approaches than a 
series of categories. The continuum ranges from practices that 
are condemned on sight (price fixing) to those that are 
condemned after only a “quick look” (certain refusals to deal) to 
those that require full rule of reason analysis (NCAA restrictions 
on payment to athletes). The choice of scrutiny is dynamic; 
practices may move along the continuum as courts become more 
familiar with them.50 Nevertheless, relative information costs 
and error costs remain the key factors.51 
Taking context and learning into account when selecting the 
level of inquiry does not prevent error. In California Dental Ass’n 
v. FTC,52 which explicitly endorsed contextual rather than 
categorical analysis, the Court mistakenly required full rule of 
reason analysis of a dental association’s restrictions on 
advertising by its members.53 The Court was too timid. It allowed 
itself to be swayed by arguments that price and quality 
advertising might work differently for dental markets than for 
other markets. The result was a false negative, particularly 
because the Ninth Circuit refused to remand for further fact-
finding.54 But attentiveness to context can avoid the opposite 
error. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., the Court held that Broadcast Music’s “blanket license” was 
not unlawful per se, even though it effectively eliminated price 
competition among Broadcast Music members, because the 
license reduced transaction costs so much that it could be 
considered a new product and the restraint on (theoretical) price 
competition would be ancillary to creation of that product. 55  
 
 50 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (“The object is to see 
whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a 
confident conclusion about the principle tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick 
(or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one. And of course what we see may 
vary over time, if rule-of-reason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions.”); 
id. at 779 (categories of analysis are not fixed and may include hybrid forms such as 
“quick look” rule of reason analysis); Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting continuum approach); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84 (finding that 
tying arrangements that involve platform software products are not subject to per se rule 
because there was too little experience with the effects of such agreements). 
 51 “Quick look” rule of reason analysis straddles this line and creates a continuum of 
analysis rather than discrete categories. See POSNER, supra note 47, at 39 (Per se 
analysis, which requires courts to generalize about the utility of a challenged practice, 
reduces the cost of decision-making, but correspondingly raises the total cost of error by 
making it more likely some practices will be held unlawful in circumstances where they 
are harmless or even procompetitive.). 
 52 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 53 Id. at 771. In particular, the restrictions precluded advertising low prices or 
characterizing quality. Id. at 762.  
 54 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 55 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23–25 (1979). 
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As these examples show, taking information and error costs 
into account will not solve all problems, but it will solve some. At 
a minimum, this cost-sensitive approach brings adjudication 
closer to the purposes of the law—the bad things it is supposed to 
avoid and the good things it might help achieve. That is more 
than can be said for formalism (unless a formal approach is the 
product of such analysis, as is sometimes the case). 
4. Costs of UPL Restrictions 
Most of the definitions surveyed in Part I fare poorly under 
analysis based on information and error costs. Maine and Florida 
sit near one end of the continuum, insisting simultaneously that 
there is such a thing as the practice of law and that it has not 
and cannot be defined. California is almost as bad. These vague 
formulations are not rules because they make so little effort to 
give content to the notion of the practice of law. The formulations 
may include a rule—such as the requirement that no one without 
a license may practice in court—but taken as written, they are 
not rules but muddles. Because these definitions do not try very 
hard, their cost of creation is low. It does not take much effort to 
say that the practice of law consists of appearing in court and 
doing things that affect the legal rights of persons, or doing 
things traditionally done by lawyers.  
For the same reason, the transmission costs of these 
prohibitions are high. These vague phrases are cheap to repeat, 
but they do not inform potential entrants whether a particular 
service is likely to be prohibited. Do the definitions of Maine, 
California, Florida, or Michigan preclude real estate agents from 
helping clients sign form offers? Do they prevent a senior 
employee from assisting a younger employee in drafting a 
grievance? These laws do not say. Neither do they provide a 
principle from which potential entrants could reliably discern the 
scope of prohibited conduct. So many things affect legal rights 
that a literal interpretation would be absurd (a driving instructor 
does not practice law when she tells a student to obey the speed 
limit), and counter-examples of permitted activity (real estate 
agents, bank clerks) are plentiful.  
A prospective entrant could do some research to get a sense 
of what bar officials or courts would use to fill in the content of 
the law, but that would take time and in many cases any 
conclusion would be uncertain. In holding that an eviction 
assistance service unlawfully practiced law, a California court 
commented that “ascertaining whether a particular activity falls 
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within this general definition [of the practice of law] may be a 
formidable endeavor,”56 and that is as true for prospective 
entrants as for courts. Hiring a lawyer would be ironic and in 
many cases would be pointless. Some lawyers would give a clear 
recommendation based on intuition, but many lawyers would 
hedge their letters so much that little useful information 
would survive.  
Application costs may be high as well. When a restriction is 
given so little content up front, tribunals and parties generally 
will incur costs to create a record and argue about how it fits into 
the capacious language of the restriction. Florida, for example, 
took the time to investigate Marilyn Brumbaugh’s “typing 
service,” in which she helped consumers fill out divorce forms.57 A 
referee heard evidence and issued findings of fact, which the 
Florida Supreme Court then sifted so it could draw a line: Ms. 
Brumbaugh could sell legal forms and type them up for clients, 
“provided that she only copy the information given to her in 
writing by her clients.”58 She could not “make inquiries nor 
answer questions from her clients as to the particular forms 
which might be necessary, how best to fill out such forms, where 
to properly file such forms, and how to present necessary 
evidence at the court hearings.”59 Whatever one thinks about 
whether this was a good use of anyone’s time, the high ex post 
costs involved are unsurprising given the small effort put into 
specification ex ante. 
Application costs need not be high, however. Even if the law 
gets no content up front, courts may take shortcuts in 
application. Birbrower provides an example.60 Rather than 
asking whether a licensed New York lawyer could provide 
adequate representation in arbitration in California, thus tying 
the scope of the UPL restriction to consumer protection, the court 
simply framed the question as being whether arbitration was an 
exception to the definition of the practice of law, even though the 
state’s core definition referred to “performing services in a court 
of justice,” which is not arbitration.61 It is at least plausible that 
the relative informality of arbitration would have eliminated any 
procedural quirks unique to California, such that an out-of-state 
lawyer could do as good a job as anyone. Relative to the goal of 
consumer protection, Birbrower is a false positive, and illustrates 
 
 56 People v. Landlords Prof’l Serv’s., 264 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 57 Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1978). 
 58 Id. at 1194. 
 59 Id. at 1193. 
 60 See generally Birbrower v. Super. Ct., 17 Cal. 4th 119 (Cal. 1998). 
 61 Id. at 128. 
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the point that economizing on application through the use of 
shortcuts poses the risk of high error costs.62  
Which brings us to agency costs—the risk that officials will 
bring enforcement actions to protect lawyers rather than 
consumers. As in Brumbaugh, UPL complaints are often made by 
lawyers who want to eliminate low-priced competition. The 
restrictions are then investigated and applied by lawyers—albeit 
lawyers who act in a different role than the complainants, and 
who presumably do not compete with the defendant. The 
concurring opinion in Brumbaugh was sensitive to how this 
might look: 
There is a popular notion that every attempt to define the practice of 
law and restrict the activities within the definition to those who are 
authorized to practice law is nothing more than a method of providing 
economic protection for lawyers . . . regardless of motive, any law or 
rule that stakes out an area “for lawyers only” will result in some 
incidental benefit to those who are authorized to practice law—a form 
of serendipity for them.63 
The concurrence goes on to argue that this view overlooks 
the risk that consumers will be harmed by “pseudo-lawyers” who 
advise “without being competent to do so and without being 
subject to restraint and punishment if they cause damage to 
some unsuspecting and uninformed persons in the process.”64 
This argument itself overlooks the obvious risk that when 
lawyers rather than clients complain about non-lawyer services, 
the benefit to lawyers will be the primary object and consumer 
protection concerns will be “incidental.”  
When enforcement officials pursue sellers who have harmed 
no clients, the costs of enforcement are agency costs, at least as 
judged by the goal of consumer protection. If the true goal of a 
UPL restriction is to benefit lawyers, then enforcement officials 
who pursue that goal are faithful agents and this argument 
would not apply. However, no restriction claims protectionism as 
its purpose. Nor could an enforcer avoid the charge by resorting 
to positivism. Enforcers generally have discretion even when a 
law is given content ex ante. The capacious provisions discussed 
in Part I leave ample room for discretion, and it is fair to judge 
 
 62 This point must be qualified by the facts of Birbrower: the client accused the 
lawyers of UPL in order to avoid the client’s fee obligation. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 4. The 
Court’s holding lowered the client’s bill because the lawyers were allowed to collect only 
for work done in New York (their licensing jurisdiction) and not California. Id. at 13. 
Notwithstanding this idiosyncratic (and opportunistic) client benefit, one would expect the 
net client effect of the holding in Birbrower to be negative.  
 63 Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d at 1194 (Karl, J., concurring).  
 64 Id.  
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enforcement by how that discretion is exercised relative to the 
stated purpose of the law.  
The agency cost analysis applies in part to laws such as 
Arizona’s, which are far more specific than Maine’s or Florida’s. 
Arizona’s extensive list of exemptions provides some ex ante 
content for its laws—a senior employee interested in helping a 
junior employee dispute a personnel action could read the 
rule and be assured that she would not be practicing law in doing 
so—unless she charged a fee.65 One might argue that this rule’s 
relation to consumer protection is oblique—the senior employee 
is no less competent for charging a fee, though the junior 
employee might be wasting money—but it is clear enough and a 
bar official enforcing the rule would have a partial defense 
against any charge that enforcement was at odds with the 
purpose of the law (the defense would be only partial so long as 
enforcement of the clear rule is still discretionary).  
B. The Baseline of Protection 
As noted above, Florida poses the question whether work 
requires “legal skill and a knowledge of the law greater than that 
possessed by the average citizen,”66 and Michigan distinguishes 
between “ordinary intelligence” and “legal training.”67 These 
statements are at least compatible with a more standards-based 
approach. They also squarely present the problem of choosing a 
baseline for a UPL restriction: should the question be whether an 
ordinary, untrained person could do the job well; whether only a 
trained lawyer could do the job well; or something else?  
UPL definitions tend to compare lawyers with ordinary 
persons who lack any legal training. That baseline sets up a false 
dichotomy, and the restrictions that rest on it are both too broad 
and too narrow (I discuss narrowness in the next section). Such 
restrictions are too broad because people learn by doing. Common 
sense and experience support the point, not to mention an 
important body of economics68 and legal doctrine. The comments 
to the ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 (and thus 
the comments of many adopted rules) state that lawyers who are 
 
 65 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN SUP. CT. R. 31(d)(2) (“An employee may designate a 
representative, not necessarily an attorney, before any board hearing or any quasi-judicial 
hearing dealing with personnel matters, providing that no fee may be charged for any 
services rendered in connection with such hearing by any such designated representative 
not an attorney admitted to practice.”). 
 66 State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), vacated sub nom. 
Sperry v. State of Fla. ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 404 (1963). 
 67 Dressel v. Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Mich. 2003). 
 68 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 
REV. ECON. STUD. 155, 156–58 (1962).  
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not competent to handle a matter acquire that competence on the 
job, either by studying hard or by associating with an 
experienced lawyer.69 Where states are attentive to learning by 
doing, real estate agents may be allowed to help clients buy and 
sell houses because they have shown themselves competent to do 
so, as have tax accountants, car dealers, and others. From a 
consumer protection perspective, it is perverse to ignore such a 
basic and easily observed fact of life. As Professor Perlman has 
written, if we focus “attention on whether the provider is 
competent to deliver a service, we can more effectively achieve 
what really matters: protecting the public.”70 
The definitional approach makes it hard to get away from 
baselines like this because definitions aim at a supposedly 
unitary concept—the practice of law. That makes it seem as 
though a single baseline could be used. But there is no reason to 
think the varied types of work that might fall within a definition 
have a single relationship to intelligence or training. The 
importance of learning by doing counsels that skill and 
knowledge should be related to the particular task at hand 
rather than to vague abstractions. The inquiry should be factual, 
not conceptual. That is how malpractice law deals with the 
question of competence among lawyers—the standard of care 
compares a practitioner to a reasonably prudent practitioner who 
can do the job in question. No other baseline is relevant, but the 
definitional approach obscures that fact. UPL restrictions and 
the standard of care both aim to protect consumers, and they 
should not operate differently. They should be made to work 
together, pointing toward their common goal. 
C. “Holding Out” and the Meaning of a Law License 
The ordinary person baseline supports restrictions that are 
too narrow because licenses do not entail competence. Even if a 
person of ordinary intelligence could not do a law-related job, it 
does not follow that anyone with a law license can. Persons of 
ordinary intelligence, but no legal training, probably would be 
daunted by the Security and Exchange Commission’s “free 
writing” prospectus rules, but many, if not most, lawyers would 
as well. Licenses do not entail competence to help clients with 
real-world problems. 
The need for learning by doing—or “experiential” learning, to 
use the ugly phrase popular right now—is a premise of many 
 
 69 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 2, 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 70 Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 
89 (2015). 
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critiques of legal education. For some years now the media and 
legal commentators have complained that newly minted lawyers 
cannot practice law. The theme has been repeated so much it 
approaches conventional wisdom even within the academy. 
The point is not that law school teaches nothing about 
lawyering—most schools do a good job of teaching many skills 
most lawyers need—but most schools do not teach many skills 
that matter to clients, and therefore matter to consumer 
protection. Some sophisticated clients refuse to pay for first or 
second-year lawyers at all, and their judgment is telling.71 These 
clients will not be misled by the implication that a license entails 
competence, but ordinary consumers, who are most in need of 
protection both from over-pricing and from incompetence, 
might be.  
Licenses are a form of holding out and, depending on the 
facts, could mislead consumers just as a non-lawyer’s claim to 
expertise could mislead them. Nevertheless, a newly admitted 
lawyer does not violate a UPL restriction by holding himself out 
as qualified to practice law. A licensed lawyer who accepts a 
matter and plans to learn by doing does not violate any UPL 
restriction, while an experienced legal assistant who is 
competent to handle the matter would. Some lawyers might 
admit to clients that they plan to learn on the job,72 but no rule 
requires such an admission, and few lawyers are likely to stress 
their inexperience. Licenses thus pose to some degree the same 
risk commonly attacked by prohibitions on non-lawyers holding 
themselves out to be lawyers.  
Consumer protection is not well served by such formal 
analysis, which is why a bar card is not a conclusive defense to 
malpractice. A cogent UPL restriction would address this risk as 
a way of improving the fit between the restriction and consumer 
protection. It would not make holding out a part of the 
definition of the practice of law, but instead tie the concept to 
competence for both lawyers and non-lawyer providers of 
law-related services.73 
 
 71 See Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s A First-Year Lawyer Worth?, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204774604576631360989675324. 
It is hard to say exactly how widespread this refusal is, either in terms of clients or in 
terms of the tasks they will not pay to have a junior lawyer perform.  
 72 See, e.g., In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Mass. 1996) (attorney admitting to 
client his inexperience in criminal law before agreeing to the representation). 
 73 For example, the D.C. definition incorporates holding out into the basic rule. See 
D.C. R. APP. CT. 49(a).  
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D. Trust and Confidence 
As noted above, the FTC has suggested that UPL definitions 
may be improved by limiting the practice of law to relationships 
involving trust and confidence in relation to legal expertise. The 
FTC’s suggestions do improve on the proposed definitions it has 
reviewed and the FTC should be applauded for doing what it can, 
but I think these suggestions ameliorate rather than cure the ills 
that beset the definitional approach to UPL. 
The trust and confidence concept the FTC has recommended 
invokes the law of fiduciary obligations. Not all fiduciaries are 
lawyers, so the concept of trust and confidence is too broad to 
help on its own. It has to be tied to the law in a way that clarifies 
rather than replicates the ambiguity of the definitions it is 
supposed to limit. That is not as easy as it might seem. 
What makes a fiduciary a fiduciary? Categorical definitions 
provide part of the answer. Trustees, physicians, and lawyers are 
fiduciaries by judicial declaration. But that fact does not help 
clarify judicial declarations defining the practice of law. Using 
one judicial declaration to define another does not bring the law 
closer to consumer welfare.  
Peering beneath such categorical declarations, one sees some 
complexity. The California Supreme Court made this point in 
City of Hope National Medical Ceter v. Genentech, Inc.74 The case 
involved a contract relating to the commercialization of patented 
technology.75 The plaintiff claimed the defendant owed it 
fiduciary duties under a proposed test embodying four elements: 
(1) one party entrusts its affairs, interests or property to another; (2) 
there is a grant of broad discretion to another, generally because of a 
disparity in expertise or knowledge; (3) the two parties have an 
“asymmetrical access to information,” meaning one party has little 
ability to monitor the other and must rely on the truth of the other 
party’s representations; and (4) one party is vulnerable and dependent 
upon the other.76 
The court rejected this test as inadequate because these four 
elements are common to contractual relationships.77 It offered an 
example of a car mechanic: 
[T]he four characteristics articulated by City of Hope and discussed 
above are common in many a contractual arrangement, yet do not 
necessarily give rise to a fiduciary relationship. For example, a person 
who takes a car to a garage for repairs has entrusted property to 
 
 74 43 Cal. 4th 375, 398 (Cal. 2008).  
 75 Id. at 380. 
 76 Id. at 387–88. 
 77 Id. at 388–89. 
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another (factor 1 of City of Hope’s test). Because the garage operator 
has expertise in the field of automotive repair but the car owner does 
not, the car owner must grant the garage operator broad discretion to 
carry out the necessary work (factor 2) and must rely on the truth of 
the garage operator’s representations about what repairs are needed 
and how they should be done (factor 3), leaving the car owner 
vulnerable and dependent on the garage operator (factor 4).78 
The court was right on this score. Taken in their ordinary 
meaning, trust and confidence are common features of 
relationships. Adding “with respect to legal matters” to these 
terms adds nothing meaningful to the definition of the practice of 
law, which presumes that the services on offer relate to the law. 
Consumers have trust and confidence in real estate agents, 
accountants, TurboTax and other forms of interactive software, 
bank clerks who help fill out forms, and so on. Otherwise they 
would not transact with such sellers.79  
This concept may be salvaged in part by modifying the 
second element in the test recited above and by replacing the 
fourth element with a new one: the absence of objective criteria 
to measure the fiduciary’s performance. When such criteria exist, 
a disparity of knowledge does not imply a need for a grant of 
discretion nor implies that the principal is vulnerable to the 
agent. The criteria will constrain the fiduciary’s performance 
notwithstanding this disparity. The fiduciary will either follow 
the dictates of the criteria or be exposed to liability.  
Suppose, for example, that a car’s brakes are always safe if 
the pads are at or above a certain thickness and are not safe 
below that thickness. A driver may know nothing about brakes or 
about this fact, but the mechanic is constrained to one of two 
choices nonetheless. She has no discretion on this point because 
to replace pads above the safe line would be wasteful and not to 
 
 78 Id. 
 79 This point is illustrated by a particularly strained application of UPL restrictions 
in Prof'l Adjusters, Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Ind. 1982), which held 
unconstitutional a statute authorizing non-lawyers to act as private adjusters negotiating 
insurance settlements on behalf of insureds. The court recited a definition of the practice 
of law that held “[t]he core element of practicing law is the giving of legal advice to a 
client and the placing of oneself in the very sensitive relationship wherein the confidence 
of the client, and the management of his affairs, is left totally in the hands of the 
attorney.” Id. at 782–83. Disciplinary rules, such as the ABA’s Model Rule 1.2(a), require 
that ultimate decisions regarding the management of a client’s affairs, at least with 
respect to the objectives of representation, rest with the client, not the lawyer. MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). More to the point raised in the 
text, as the dissent in Tandon noted, insurance companies employed non-lawyer adjusters 
and seemed to have no trouble forming satisfactory relationships with them. Tandon, 433 
N.E.2d at 786–87 (Hunter, J., dissenting). The upshot of the Court’s decision was to 
deprive insureds, but not insurers, of the benefits of competition, the exact opposite of 
what UPL laws are supposed to do.  
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replace thinner pads would be negligent. Something like this is 
what Michigan had in mind when it excluded from the definition 
of the practice of law work that was “so standardized” in forms 
that completing them “requires only ordinary intelligence rather 
than legal training.”80 That is not quite right—a person might 
need to be smarter than average to understand the forms—but 
the point is materially similar.  
By focusing on relationships, the FTC’s recommendation 
presumably excludes written material (including interactive 
software) from the “practice of law,” and that is good. But from a 
general point of view, the FTC’s reliance on trust and confidence 
is best understood as a wise resort to a second-best solution that 
has a chance of being adopted. That chance justifies the 
recommendations on the ground that the impossible best should 
not defeat the possible good, but the trust and confidence 
recommendation works within the definitional structure and 
thus suffers from the problems of that structure. It relies on 
concepts that are too broad, and narrowing those concepts would 
replicate too much of the debate the recommendation is intended 
to clarify. There is a better way.  
III. 
In light of the preceding analysis, I find the appeal of 
licensing hard to understand.81 Assuming for present purposes 
that licensing is here to stay, however, this analysis 
suggests that a law addressing provision of legal services 
should: (1) minimize the aggregate costs of information, error, 
and enforcement; (2) tie the scope of the prohibition to 
competence; and (3) tie the scope of inquiry to the novelty and 
complexity of a situation. Each of these features should aim to 
enhance consumer protection from both incompetence and 
overpricing. The preceding critique also suggests that such a law 
should not (4) attempt to define the practice of law; (5) relate 
legal services to some baseline conception of intelligence; or 
(6) take a categorical approach to “holding out” violations.  
Different structures could accommodate these lessons, but 
taken together they argue strongly for standards as a default 
matter, with the selective use of some rules to economize on 
 
 80 Dressel v. Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Mich. 2003). 
 81 Even so powerful an advocate of increased access to legal services as Professor 
Rhode envisions non-lawyer provision of services subject to “licensing and certification 
systems that impose competence qualifications, ethical standards, and effective 
malpractice remedies.” DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 21 (2004). However, 
Professor Rhode leaves open the possibility of simple registration and voluntary 
certification regimes, id. at 90, which seems to me a more desirable approach.  
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costs. The following is one such structure. (If you are not 
interested in the detail, skip to section (B).) 
A. A Proposed UPL Law 
Title N: Legal service providers 
1. Definitions 
 A. “Adjudicative body” means one or more neutral 
officials who hear evidence or argument offered by a party or 
parties and who render a judgment affecting a party’s interests in 
a particular matter. 
 B. “Competent,” “competence,” and “competently” refer 
to possession of the skill of an ordinarily prudent person qualified 
to perform a service or task and to the exercise of that skill in such 
performance. 
 C. “Hold out” and “holding out” refer to any expression 
that would convey to a reasonable consumer of the services offered 
that the service provider possesses a level of skill, qualification, or 
credential.  
 D. “Lawyer” means a person licensed to practice law in 
this State. 
 E. “Provider” means a person or entity, including but 
not limited to a Lawyer, offering to assist another with respect to 
any matter involving or affecting legal rights or obligations, 
regardless whether a fee is sought.  
 F. “Tribunal” means a court or other adjudicative 
body created by a governmental entity; the term does not extend to 
means of dispute resolution established by consent of the parties, 
such as private arbitration or mediation. 
2. Provision of legal services 
 A. Holding out: No Provider shall hold itself out as 
having any skill, qualification, or credential it does not have at 
the time the expression constituting holding out is made. 
 B. Tribunals: No Provider may appear before a 
Tribunal except in accordance with all rules adopted by the 
Tribunal.  
 C. Competence: No Provider shall offer any service the 
Provider is not competent to perform at the time the service is to be 
rendered. 
  (1)  A Lawyer is presumed competent to offer 
legal services. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence that 
the Lawyer has offered to perform or has performed services the 
Lawyer is not competent to perform. 
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  (2) A non-Lawyer Provider bears the burden of 
producing evidence that, on its face, tends to show that the 
Provider is competent to perform the services the Provider offers. 
Such evidence need not relate solely to the specific Provider whose 
competence is at issue but may include, without limitation, 
evidence tending to show that the services the Provider offers are 
provided competently by other non-Lawyer Providers. A Provider 
who has met this burden of production shall be presumed 
competent. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the 
Provider has offered to perform or has performed services the 
Provider is not competent to perform. 
  (3) A Provider who proposes to become 
competent in the course of representation violates this subsection 
unless, prior to retention, the Provider informs the client or 
customer, in a writing signed by the client or customer, of (i) the 
Provider’s intention to acquire such competence in the course of 
the representation, (ii) the means by which the Provider proposes 
to acquire such competence, and (iii) whether the client or 
customer will be charged for time spent acquiring such 
competence. 
3. Remedies 
 (A) Any Provider who violates Section 2(A) through 
expression directed to a general audience shall be fined $[N] 
per communication. For purposes of this subsection a 
“communication” refers to the content that constitutes a violation. 
Repetition or continued display of the same or materially similar 
content, such as, without limitation, persistent display on a 
website or multiple publications of the same advertisement, 
constitutes one violation. 
 (B) Any Provider who violates Section 2(A) through 
person-to-person communication with a client or consumer shall 
be fined $[N] per client or consumer to whom such communication 
is made, regardless whether the client or consumer hires the 
Provider for any work. A client or consumer to whom a 
communication is made in violation of Section 2(A) may sue such 
Provider for any damages caused by such violation; a client or 
consumer who prevails in such a suit shall be awarded attorney’s 
fees and costs of suit including, without limitation, expert fees. 
 (C) A Provider who violates Section 2(B) is subject to 
sanction or other punishment by the Tribunal. 
 (D) [State entity] may sue in any court to enforce 
Section 2(C). In any such proceeding a court shall have discretion 
to fine a Provider found to have violated Section 2(C) no more 
than $[N] for each violation proved; for each violation the amount 
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of such fine shall be proportionate to the risk of harm created by 
such violation. In any such proceeding the court may enjoin 
continuing violations of Section 2(C). 
 (E) Any person harmed by a violation of Section 2(C) 
may sue to recover any harm caused by such violation and, upon 
prevailing, shall be awarded attorney’s fees and costs of suit 
including, without limitation, expert fees. 
B. Why the Proposed Law Makes Sense 
Competence is the central principle of this proposal. Rather 
than comparing a given activity to a partial definition of the 
practice of law, with one exception the proposed rule asks only 
two questions: Is the seller lying about what it is selling, and is 
the seller competent to do the job undertaken? Competence is 
defined operationally and mimics the standard of care used in 
malpractice cases. That standard is basically horizontal; it asks 
not whether a defendant provided some Platonic ideal of service, 
but whether the defendant did as good a job as reasonably 
prudent people in the field would do. 
Because the proposal rests on standards, its application costs 
are high.82 I think it is preferable to current approaches, 
however, on two grounds. First, to the extent definitional 
approaches avoid the cost of finding out what a defendant is 
doing and how they are doing it, those approaches will tend to be 
arbitrary. The definitions themselves provide little notice as to 
their scope, so there is no reduction in information costs to offset 
this inevitable arbitrariness. The proposal will tend not to 
produce arbitrary decisions, though of course some mistakes 
would be made under this regime as under any other.  
Second, to the extent that definitional approaches invite 
inquiry and the creation of a record, they then compare this 
record to definitional categories rather than to performance. 
Brumbaugh is a good example of this point. Having spent the 
time to create a record, the Court did not take the obvious next 
step and ask whether Ms. Brumbaugh did a good job. Did she 
pick the right forms? Did she hurt anyone? What bad thing 
would happen if she were allowed to keep doing what she had 
been doing? The costs of inquiry should be used to reduce error 
costs, relative to a baseline of consumer protection, by assessing 
the record in terms of consumer welfare. Definitional approaches 
tend not to do that; the proposal does exactly that. 
 
 82 The only exception pertains to tribunals, which are just taken off the table on the 
grounds that they will do what they want anyway, and there is no point trying to fight 
about whether non-lawyers could do as good a job in court as lawyers. 
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The proposal uses presumptions to limit the costs somewhat. 
Lawyers are presumed competent by reason of their knowledge 
though the presumption may be rebutted by proof of the kind 
commonly submitted in malpractice cases. Competence is 
contextual, as it should be. In each case the level of inquiry 
needed would depend on context and experience, as it does with 
respect to the antitrust inquiries discussed above. Other than 
tribunals, the proposal does not create per se categories, but one 
would expect courts to develop various versions of “quick look” 
scrutiny for different types of work.  
Holding out is treated as a problem that is distinct from 
competence and which does not turn on definitions. Lawyers may 
hold out as well as non-lawyers; judged from the perspective of 
competence a license should not deflect attention from this fact. 
To some extent, this provision will overlap with advertising 
restrictions, but I do not think that is a point against it. The 
related idea of learning by doing is captured by an affirmative 
disclosure requirement for lawyers planning to train on the 
client’s job.  
A few follow-up issues should be noted. The proposal 
effectively opens the door to interstate practice because a lawyer 
not licensed in a state could do work as a provider, subject to the 
requirement that he or she not claim to be licensed in the state 
and that he or she perform his or her work competently. That is 
currently the case with respect to whatever states exclude from 
their definitions of unlicensed practice. If the provider needed to 
learn state-specific procedures, then the learning-by-doing 
disclosure would apply and the out of state lawyer still would have 
to deal with tribunals. Agency law would apply to all providers, 
and I would extend privilege to all providers. Just as a lawyer’s 
malpractice does not vitiate privilege, a provider found to act 
incompetently would not vitiate a client’s privilege. Finally, 
though some rules of professional conduct are simple protectionism, 
such as the prohibition on lawyers buying claims,83 I would leave 
in place whatever rules a state might have. One step at a time.  
C. Antitrust Enforcement as an Alternative 
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC84 has suggested to some that 
current antitrust doctrine might be used to trim some of the 
anticompetitive aspects of UPL regulations. The Dental 
Examiners opinion applied the Supreme Court’s rule of immunity 
 
 83 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 84 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
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for state-imposed restraints on trade to a letter sent by North 
Carolina’s board of dental examiners that suggested the service 
of teeth-whitening was the practice of dentistry and therefore 
could be provided only by licensed dentists.85 The rule of immunity 
traces to Parker v. Brown,86 and exempts from antitrust scrutiny 
restraints on trade a state adopts “as sovereign.”87 If a state 
delegates regulation to a body staffed by members actively 
participating in the regulated industry, immunity applies if the 
body enforces a clear state policy to restrain trade and the body is 
subject to active supervision by the state.88 
Most UPL restrictions should satisfy the sovereignty 
requirement, either because they are expressed in legislation or 
are adopted by a state supreme court acting in a legislative 
capacity.89 But these restrictions tend to be written generally, as 
the survey in Part I illustrates. The devil is in the details, and 
where enforcement of a clear policy is delegated to a board 
controlled by market participants, the state must “review and 
approve interstitial policies made by the entity claiming 
immunity.”90 This “active supervision” requirement is vague: 
Active supervision need not entail day-to-day involvement in an 
agency’s operations or micromanagement of its every decision. Rather, 
the question is whether the State’s review mechanisms provide 
“realistic assurance” that a nonsovereign actor’s anticompetitive 
conduct “promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s 
individual interests.”91 
The Court’s nonexclusive list of what the requirement entails 
states that state review must be actual not potential, focus on 
substance and not form, and that the reviewer have the power to 
veto a decision by a competitor-controlled board.92 
Nothing in these requirements actually keeps a state 
employee from rubber-stamping anticompetitive restrictions. 
Particularly in light of the professional courtesy that wisps its 
way through opinions in this field, I do not see the Federation of 
Dentists decision as promising much in the way of UPL reform. It 
would be better to focus on the state policies themselves.  
 
 85 Id. at 1110.  
 86 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 87 Id. at 352. 
 88 See Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110; FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 
631–32 (1992); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
105 (1980). 
 89 Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110. 
 90 Id. at 1112. 
 91 Id. at 1116. 
 92 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
States should stop trying to define the indefinable, and stop 
trying to treat competence as a deductive, conceptual issue 
rather than a factual issue. They should not propound vague 
definitions and pretend the definitions are rules when in fact 
they convey little information and, even when used well, incur 
the costs of standards. This approach is wasteful, frustrating, 
and does a poor job of protecting consumers from the harm of 
overpricing as well as the harm of incompetence.  
An open embrace of standards tied to competence would be 
preferable. Restrictions on unlicensed practice and the standard 
of care are both meant to protect consumers. The two concepts 
should be harmonized and merged. Rather than trying to define a 
concept in one breath, while proclaiming with the next that 
definition is impossible, the law should dispense with definitions 
and keep its eye on consumers, who need protection from both 
incompetence and over-pricing. Basic antitrust doctrine provides 
an example of how this goal might be achieved, and the 
conventional means of comparing rules against standards 
suggests it should be achieved with respect to the provision of 
law-related services.  
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